Michael Collins

One of the first initiatives of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan was a foreign policy based on "zero problems with neighbors." From his selection as Prime Minister in 2003, Erdogan led efforts to resolve Iran's conflicts with the West over the Iranian nuclear program. The regime also formed a tight bond with Syria, as did Erdogan with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In 2011, Erdogan abandoned the alliance with Syria by supporting a violent rebellion to oust President Assad and his government. This marked the undoing of the zero problems policy.

Erdogan consistently denies supporting the jihadists among the Syrian rebels, a claim that even the Prime Minister can't believe. From the start of the violence in Syria through at least December 2012, Erdogan's government supported the Al Nusra fighters, openly aligned with Al Qaeda. In July 2012, Haaretz broke this story: Turkey sets up secret base to bring aid to Syria rebels, sources say . This not-so-secret base trained and armed fighters headed for Syria.

Since the start of the violent conflict in 2011, Turkey has provided safe transit to the Syrian conflict for anti-Syrian government jihadists from Pakistan, Egypt, and throughout the Middle East. Erdogan's government provides safe havens for terrorists on its southern border with Syria. When the Obama administration threatened to bomb Syria as punishment for the alleged role in a chemical weapons attack, Erdogan was openly enthusiastic.

Erdogan's problems at home and with friends and neighbors

Erdogan and his AKP Party dominate the politics of Turkey. However, vulnerabilities from Turkey's Syria policy persist and grow.

There is broad based public opposition to Erdogan's efforts to support Syrian rebels. A 2013 poll found 72% of Turks opposed to intervention in Syria. Half of those who voted for Erdogan's AKP party in the last election oppose intervention.

Rather than moderate his policy toward Syria, Erdogan went on the offensive. He claimed that opposition to his Syria policy originated among Turkey's Alevi population. The Alevis share the same approach to Islam as the Alawites in Syria, the Muslim sect that dominates Syria's government, including President Assad.

Like so much of what Erdogan says, the charge against the Alevis is disingenuous. At around 15% of the population, it is simply not possible that the Alevis account for 72% of Turks who oppose his Syria policy.

Erdogan's bluster can't change the glaring fact that his anti Syria policy has undermined his public support.

Erdogan's once positive relationship with Iran is in tatters as a result of his Syria policy. Iran is spending considerable resources and effort to aid the al-Assad government. Their one time "zero problems" friends, the Erdogan government, is largely responsible for both the expenditure of resources and human effort and the threat to Iran posed by a jihadist, Al Qaeda victory in Syria.

Erdogan mounted harsh criticism of the United States the moment President Barack Obama called off the promised missile attack on Syria. His government followed up with a major arms purchase from China. This was seen as sending a message to Washington that Erdogan was upset at the cancelled missile attack.

Erdogan's Achilles Heel

The status of Turkey's Kurds is central to the future of the Turkey. The Kurds represent 20% of Turkey's population. Kurdish independence forces have battled the government for years seeking an autonomous Kurdish state. The last thing Turkey can tolerate is an independent Kurdish state occupying the eastern third of the nation.

Thanks to Erdogan's robust support of the Syrian rebels and foreign fighters, President Bashir al-Assad was forced to make some bold moves for the Syrian state to survive. His government granted Syrian Kurds autonomy in a contiguous region bordering Turkey. The Syrian Kurdish state became a symbol for Kurdish desires for independence everywhere. The process of receiving autonomy through negotiations was another plus. There was no protracted guerrilla war, no destruction of property, just a statutory declaration. Erdogan government opposed the Syrian Kurds declaration of self-rule.

This living example of Kurdish freedom and autonomy forced Erdogan's to accelerate his negotiations with Turkish Kurds, which he did with considerable fanfare. Style won't substitute for substance to satisfy the wary Kurds. Soon, Erdogan may have just two options: either give the Turkish Kurds the same deal Assad gave their Syrian brothers or face a renewal of hostilities. In either case, Erdogan loses.

Was supporting a bloody, violent, illegal attack on the nation of Syria worth it considering the risks that support delivered to Turkey?

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