Andrew Korybko
Andrew Korybko's Newsletter

Russia is worried that the influence of hawkish forces inside the US’ “deep state” might be growing and could ultimately lead to a large-scale conventional strike against it, including by proxy through Ukraine, which Russia hopes to deter by reminding them that this would result in World War III.

The hullabaloo over Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine is misplaced since all that Putin did was explicitly confirm what was already self-evident to all serious observers. Nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to any overwhelming non-nuclear strike against it or its mutual defense ally Belarus, nor that it would overlook those who partook in such a provocation by proxy. Here’s exactly what Putin told the Security Councilduring their latest meeting on Wednesday:

And here are some background briefings to review before analyzing what this all means:

● 19 August: “Why Might Ukraine Want Russia To Use Nuclear Weapons?”

● 21 August: “Don’t Expect A Radical Response From Russia To The US’ Involvement In Ukraine’s Invasion Of Kursk”

● 12 September: “Korybko To Karaganov: Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Shouldn’t Apply To Any Territorial Encroachment”

● 15 September: “Russia & The West Are Engaged In Political Choreography Over Ukraine’s Use Of Long-Range Weapons”

● 15 September: “What Would Really Be Achieved By Russia Using Nuclear Weapons In Ukraine At This Point?”

● 18 September: “The ‘War Of Attrition’ Was Improvised & Not Russia’s Plan All Along”

● 21 September: “Lavrov Explained What Russia Hopes To Achieve By Talking About Its Red Lines”

● 24 September: “Russia Rebuked The Hawks By Confirming That It Won’t Test Nukes Unless The US Does So First”

The above will now be summarized for the reader’s convenience.

Russia has no reason to use nuclear weapons first in Ukraine since it can accomplish all its goals in this improvised “war of attrition” through conventional means. Crossing that threshold risks losing the support of its close Chinese and Indian trade partners, which is what Ukraine wants. Russia also won’t launch a nuclear first strike against NATO unlike what some have speculated. Putin has remained calm through every one of the West’s escalations and continues doing his utmost to avoid World War III.

No matter how negatively some in the West might view his restraint, such as misperceiving it as weakness, their main decisionmakers still know better than to cross Russia’s ultimate red lines of launching a direct attack against it and/or Belarus or a large-scale one against them via their Ukrainian proxy. The first scenario is totally out of the question, while the second one has been openly discussed among some Westerners amidst the debate over letting Ukraine use their long-range weapons.

A few NATO-backed but Ukrainian-fronted long-range attacks would certainly be an escalation, but they wouldn’t cross Russia’s abovementioned ultimate red lines. The problem though is that some Westerners have convinced themselves that Russia is indeed so weak that it wouldn’t consider a nuclear response in the scenario of large-scale strikes against it. It’s this hawkish faction of the Western elite that his message is directed towards since he fears that they might be rising in influence.

Their comparatively more pragmatic rivals who still call the shots always signal their escalatory intentions far in advance so that Russia could prepare itself and thus be less likely to “overreact” in some way that risks World War III. Likewise, Russia continues restraining itself from replicating the US’ “shock-and-awe” campaign in order to reduce the likelihood of the West “overreacting” by directly intervening in the conflict to salvage their geopolitical project and thus risking World War III.

It can only be speculated whether this interplay is due to each’s permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) behaving responsibly on their own considering the enormity of what’s at stake or if it’s the result of a “gentlemen’s agreement”. Whatever the truth may be, the aforesaid model accounts for the unexpected moves or lack thereof from each, which are the US correspondingly telegraphing its escalatory intentions and Russia never seriously escalating in kind.

Russia senses that the balance of influence between these factions within the US’ “deep state” might be shifting from the comparatively pragmatic one to their more hawkish rivals, however, which explains why Putin felt the need to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about his country’s nuclear doctrine. One explanation is that the US’ ruling liberal-globalists want to provoke a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis ahead of Trump’s potential second inauguration in order to sabotage his promise to broker a peace deal.

Another, which isn’t mutually exclusive, is that even the comparatively pragmatic faction is beginning to think that Russia is weak and therefore unlikely to escalate if the US launches a large-scale strike against it and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. In their mind, this might coerce Russia into making unilateral concessions in exchange for peace, which could take the form of it withdrawing from some of the Ukrainian-claimed territory that it fought so hard to obtain control over since February 2022.

Putin really doesn’t want to risk doing anything that could inadvertently lead to World War III, hence why he’s thus far refused to reciprocally escalate every time that the West does, not to mention whenever they and their Ukrainian proxy crossed Russia’s earlier red lines. Nevertheless, he also doesn’t want Russia to lose its sovereignty if the West blackmails to that end it by exploiting these concerns to coerce it into a never-ending series of unilateral concessions, ergo why he authorized the special operation.

He therefore realized that it’s time to explicitly confirm what was already self-evident about Russia’s nuclear doctrine in order to dissuade the American “deep state’s” hawks from launching a large-scale strike against his country and/or Belarus by proxy through Ukraine. Depending on how serious it could be, Russia might consider responding with nukes against Ukraine and/or even some NATO countries, including before the damage is known upon “receiving reliable information about a massive launch”.

Once again, nobody should have ever thought that Russia wouldn’t consider a nuclear response to such a scenario, nor that it would overlook those who partook in it. Just because this wasn’t earlier explicitly articulated in its doctrine doesn’t mean that Putin would be forced to rule it out. No leader would ever let their hands be tied like that. Everyone knows this, but US hawks still had to be reminded of it just in case they’ve become so delusional as to think they could do pull off such an attack with impunity.

Image: © N/A. TPV: http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/aQ6e